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A B S T R A C T
In highly motorised countries, some sectors of the population own and use cars despite struggling
to aﬀord their running costs, and so may be particularly vulnerable to motor fuel prices increases,
whether market-led or policy-driven. This paper proposes a novel, disaggregated approach to
investigating vulnerability to such increases at the household level. We propose a set of indicators
of ‘car-related economic stress’ (CRES), based on individual household level expenditure data for
the UK, to identify which low-income households spend disproportionately on running motor
vehicles, and to assess the depth of their economic stress. By subsequently linking the dataset to
local fuel price data, we are able to model the disaggregated price elasticities of car fuel demand.
This provides us with an indicator of each household’s adaptive capacity to fuel price increases.
The ﬁndings show that ‘Low Income, High Cost’ households (LIHC) account for 9% of UK
households and have distinct socio-demographic characteristics. Interestingly, they are char-
acterised by very low responses to fuel price increases, which may cause them to compromise on
other important areas of their household expenditures. Simulations suggest that a 20% increase
in fuel prices would substantially increase the depth, but not the incidence of CRES. Overall, the
study sheds light on a sector of the population with high levels of vulnerability to fuel price
increases, owing to high exposure, high sensitivity and low adaptive capacity. This raises chal-
lenges for social, environmental and resilience policy in the transport sector.
1. Introduction
One of the major uncertainties for transport policy and practice concerns the level of future fuel prices, and thus their aﬀordability
for the domestic and commercial travellers. Oil derived fuels still account for the overwhelming majority of energy consumption in
the transport sector (EEA, 2015), making it very exposed to oil price ﬂuctuations. These may be sudden and hard to predict
(Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Gronwald, 2016; Alexander, 2017), although the longer-term outlook is for overall increases in the real
price of crude oil worldwide (World Bank, 2016).
At the same time, climate change mitigation eﬀorts may lead to higher motor fuel prices, as governments increase taxes and/or
reduce fossil fuel subsidies (Ross et al., 2017). Whether market-led or policy-driven, increases in motor fuel prices have important
eﬀects on the transport system, including, crucially, on levels of car use (Bastian et al., 2016; Wadud and Baierl, 2017). They can be
used to encourage modal shift, and to support compact city planning and transit-oriented development (De Vos and Witlox, 2013;
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Guimarães et al., 2014; Gusdorf and Hallegatte, 2007; Ortuño-Padilla and Fernández-Aracil, 2013), as well as the uptake of more
eﬃcient and alternative fuel vehicle technology (Li et al., 2009; Schäfer et al., 2009; Wadud, 2014).
An issue that has received limited attention, however, is the hardships that motor fuel price increases may inﬂict upon some
lower-income sectors of society. There is some research evidence to suggest that in highly motorised countries a number of
households already struggle to aﬀord the running costs of cars, while relying on car mobility to satisfy their accessibility needs
(Belton Chevallier et al., 2018; Curl et al., 2018; Currie and Delbosc, 2011; Litman, 2016; Lucas, 2011; Mattioli, 2017; Mullen and
Marsden, 2018; Ortar, 2018; Rock et al., 2016; Taylor et al., 2009). This can make these households particularly vulnerable to motor
fuel prices increases, which is problematic from a social equity perspective. Also, from an environmental policy viewpoint, it may
hinder the implementation of measures such as carbon taxes and the reduction of fossil fuel subsidies due to worries about social
inequalities. It is possibly partly for this reason that, to date, most governments have been reluctant to substantially increase fuel
prices, due to public and political non-acceptability issues (Lyons and Chatterjee, 2002; Ross et al., 2017), even though such increases
would appear to be common-sense from an energy-reduction policy perspective.
In this paper, we put forward a set of indicators to assess the incidence and depth of ‘car-related economic stress’ (CRES) in the
UK. We then use econometric modelling methods to estimate disaggregated price elasticities of fuel demand, which we take to be
indicative of the degree of car dependence and adaptive capacity of individual households. Finally, we use these elasticity estimates
to model the impact of fuel price increases on CRES in the UK.
In particular, the study makes two novel scientiﬁc contributions. First, it highlights the household characteristics associated with
vulnerability to fuel price increases, complementing the emphasis of previous research on the importance of spatial factors. Second, it
demonstrates how a social indicator approach to transport (un)aﬀordability can be combined with econometric analysis to produce
realistic estimates for future price-based scenarios. The proposed approach can be implemented in any jurisdiction where household
expenditure and fuel price data with enough spatial and temporal variation is available, and has thus the potential to be used as a
diagnostic and planning tool in transport, land use and social policy making, in the UK and elsewhere.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. In Section 3, our approach is set out in detail, along
with the data used. Section 4 presents the ﬁndings, which are discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we draw conclusions and discuss
policy implications.
2. Literature review
This study draws from and builds upon three contemporary strands of research: (i) transport and social exclusion, (ii) ‘oil vul-
nerability’ and (iii) the heterogeneity in the response to fuel prices. These are brieﬂy reviewed below.
2.1. Transport, social exclusion, and aﬀordability
Research on transport and social exclusion (Lucas, 2012; Ricci et al., 2016; Schwanen et al., 2015; Titheridge et al., 2014)
investigates the causes and consequences of reduced access to key services and opportunities, highlighting for example the socio-
economic factors associated with low levels of travel activity (Lucas et al., 2016a). Studies have generally focused on low-income
carless households, given their limited opportunities to travel and accessibility to opportunities (e.g. Klein and Smart, 2017). Perhaps
slightly less attention has been given to car-owning households, who may be struggling to aﬀord the cost of their travel. However,
rapidly ﬂuctuating fuel prices, stagnating real incomes and increasing car ownership among low-income groups in many advanced
economies has drawn increasing attention to questions of aﬀordability within the transport sector (AAA, 2016; Guerra and Kirschen,
2016; Litman, 2016; Mattioli et al., 2017a). The costs of daily mobility, most notably by car, can have important negative impacts on
household ﬁnances, leading households to curtail their expenditures in other essential areas, to restrict their activity spaces, and/or to
tip them into debt, all of which can ultimately result in social exclusion (Belton Chevallier et al., 2018; Curl et al., 2018; Currie and
Delbosc, 2011; Lucas, 2011; Mullen and Marsden, 2018; Ortar, 2018; Rock et al., 2016; Taylor et al., 2009; Walks, 2018).
Diﬀerent terms are used in the literature to describe the condition of households who need to spend a disproportionately high
share of their income to get where they need to go. These include ‘forced car ownership’ (Curl et al., 2018; Currie and Senbergs,
2007), ‘transport poverty’ (Gleeson and Randolph, 2002; Sustrans, 2012), ‘commuter fuel poverty’ (Lovelace and Philips, 2014) and
‘transport aﬀordability’ (Litman, 2016; Lucas et al., 2016b). In this paper, we use the term ‘car-related economic stress’ (CRES)
(Mattioli and Colleoni, 2016) to refer to a subset of transport aﬀordability problems, solely related to expenditure on motoring. Existing
research on developed countries has largely focused on the aﬀordability of owning and operating motor vehicles (Lucas et al., 2016b),
reﬂecting the fact that motoring accounts for around 80% of all household spending on transport in OECD countries (Kauppila, 2011).
2.2. Oil vulnerability
Historically high oil prices between the early-2000s and 2014 have triggered a wave of studies into ‘oil vulnerability’ in urban
areas, notably in Australia (Dodson and Sipe, 2007, 2008; Fishman and Brennan, 2009; Leung et al., 2015; 2018; Runting et al.,
2011), but also increasingly in Europe (Büttner et al., 2013; Gertz et al., 2015; Lovelace and Philips, 2014; Mattioli et al., 2017b;
Nicolas et al., 2012). These set out to identify the areas where households would be most severely aﬀected by motor fuel price
increases, typically through the use of composite indicators at the small-area level.
Drawing on notions of ‘social vulnerability’ (Adger, 2006; Brooks, 2003), recent contributions (Büttner et al., 2013; Leung et al.,
2015; 2018; Mattioli et al., 2017b) argue that oil vulnerability indicators should cover three elements: (i) exposure to fuel price
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increases – assessed with measures of average expenditure on fuel in the area (or proxies such as car ownership and use); (ii)
sensitivity – generally operationalised as average income levels; (iii) adaptive capacity – conceptualised as the viability of modes
alternative to the car, i.e. the opposite of car dependence.
The adequate consideration of adaptive capacity is essential for an accurate assessment of vulnerability (Leung et al., 2015; 2018;
Rendall et al., 2014; Runting et al., 2011), as good accessibility by alternative modes makes modal shift possible, reducing the need
for car use (and hence oil vulnerability) even in areas where car travel is currently high. Due to limited data availability, however,
several studies proxy car dependence with indicators of revealed car ownership and/or use (e.g. Akbari and Habib, 2014; Dodson and
Sipe, 2007; Fishman and Brennan, 2009). As a result, what these studies actually map is car-related economic stress in the present
time (i.e. areas where people are already spending too much on motoring), rather than what they claim to do, i.e. calculate the
prospective expenditure and resilience of areas with reference to a future scenario where fuel prices are signiﬁcantly higher (although
of course there are clear overlaps between the two).
Furthermore, to date, the large majority of studies have investigated the oil vulnerability of spatial units, e.g. census tracts
(Dodson and Sipe, 2007). Their ﬁndings generally show that low-income, car-dependent suburban and peri-urban areas are the most
vulnerable. Insights into the socio-economic factors associated with vulnerability at the disaggregate level of households are still
relatively rare (but see Lovelace and Philips, 2014; Nicolas et al., 2012).
A relevant ﬁnding of previous research is that oil vulnerability can be compounded or alleviated depending on urban socio-spatial
conﬁgurations, i.e. the distribution of diﬀerent income groups within city regions. The ‘regressive’ conﬁguration of Australian me-
tropolitan areas means that low-income households tend to live in the most car dependent areas, which further deepens their
vulnerability (Dodson and Sipe, 2007). Studies in other jurisdictions such as Canada (Akbari and Habib, 2014) and New Zealand
(Rendall et al., 2014) have shown markedly diﬀerent patterns, with outer suburban areas characterized by higher incomes and thus
lower vulnerability.
In one of the few existing studies on Europe, Büttner et al. (2013) ﬁnd contrasting patterns: Munich (Germany) resembles the
conﬁguration of Australian cities, while Lyon (France) is characterized by wealthier periurban areas, which results in a more mixed
spatial patterning of fuel price vulnerability. This is not surprising as European cities have a variety of urban socio-spatial conﬁg-
urations, due to historical factors (Kesteloot, 2005).
2.3. Heterogeneity in the price elasticity of motor fuel demand
There is a long tradition of research on the elasticity of aggregate car travel and fuel demand to changes in fuel prices (see e.g.
Austin, 2008; Dahl and Sterner, 1991; Goodwin et al., 2004). More recently, a number of econometric modelling studies have
demonstrated that this elasticity varies depending on e.g. trip purpose, geographical area, and a range of household and vehicle
characteristics (Bastian and Börjesson, 2015; Cornut, 2016; Dillon et al., 2015; Gillingham, 2014; Gillingham et al., 2015; Kayser,
2000; Nicol, 2003; Santos and Catchesides, 2005; Wadud et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b; West and Williams, 2004). The key over-arching
ﬁndings from these studies suggest that demand is more elastic in urban and higher-density areas (Bastian and Börjesson, 2015;
Cornut, 2016; Santos and Catchesides, 2005; Wadud et al., 2009, 2010a), which is generally attributed to lower levels of car de-
pendence. Also, work trips appear to be less responsive than non-work trips (Dillon et al., 2015) while multiple-vehicle, multiple
wage earner households tend to be more responsive, possibly as a result of within-household switching of vehicles (Wadud et al.,
2010a).
The literature provides conﬂicting evidence on the relationship between income and fuel price elasticity. Among studies con-
sidering the elasticity of household fuel demand in the US, Kayser (2000) ﬁnds lower price responsiveness among low income
households, while West and Williams (2004) and Wadud et al. (2010a) ﬁnd the opposite pattern. Relevant to this study, Santos and
Catchesides (2005) also ﬁnd that the cost elasticity of vehicle-miles travelled in the UK declines with higher income. While many
studies of heterogeneity are motivated by a concern for the distributional impacts and welfare implications of increases in the price of
fuel, notably in relation to possible environmental taxes, this research remains rather disconnected from studies of transport-related
social exclusion and oil vulnerability.
3. Approach, data and methods
3.1. Approach
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate a newly developed, dissagregated approach to the assessment of vulnerability to fuel price
increases, which: (a) takes households, rather than geographical areas, as the unit of analysis, and (b) more fully accounts for levels of
car dependence and adaptive capacity.
In order to assess adaptive capacity at the household level, we use disaggregated estimates of the price elasticity of fuel demand.
This builds on the hypothesis that:
“car-dependent households would demonstrate an unwillingness or inability to change their behaviour in response to an input
change, such as cost. The levels of car usage would be relatively unresponsive to changes in the cost of driving in a car-dependent
household. This… can be measured quantitatively, via the price elasticity of demand for car use, so it may be researchers’ best proxy
to quickly gauge the levels of car dependence in a society”
(Gorham, 2002, p. 109, emphasis added).
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The empirical study consists of three main steps. First, we propose indicators of CRES modelled on the oﬃcial English indicator of
domestic ‘fuel poverty’, and apply them to British family expenditure data (see Section 3.3 below). This allows us to quantify the
number of households experiencing CRES, as well as the depth of their economic stress. We also investigate the spatial and socio-
economic correlates of CRES with logistic regression models. In a second step, we link the fuel expenditure data to fuel prices at
postcode district level for the period 2006–2012. The temporal and geographical variation in fuel price data allows us to model the
disaggregated price elasticities of fuel demand (see Section 3.4 below). We are, thus, able to show how elasticities vary depending on
household characteristics, and to estimate the price response of CRES households. In the third step, based on the estimation of unique
price elasticity values for each household, we model changes in the prevalence and depth of CRES in a fuel price increase scenario.
3.2. Data
The analysis is based on the UK Living Costs and Food Survey (LCFS), a cross-sectional expenditure survey that has been conducted
annually since 2006, with a ﬁnal sample of approximately 5,000–6000 households per year. Interviews are spread over 12months to
ensure that seasonal variation is captured. The sample for Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland) is clustered into primary sample
unit corresponding to postal sectors. In 2012, the response rate was 52% in Great Britain (ONS, 2013). Weights are provided within
the dataset to correct for non-response. The analysis in this paper takes into account of both non-response weights and sample
clustering.
The LCFS collects information on household expenditure in two ways: all individuals aged 16 and over complete a two-week
expenditure diary; infrequent or irregular expenditure (e.g. rent, vehicle insurance, home improvements, and package holidays) is
captured through retrospective questions in the household questionnaire. In the ﬁnal dataset, expenditure information is provided on
a weekly-equivalent basis, with a detailed breakdown that is consistent with the international standard COICOP classiﬁcation
(Classiﬁcation of Individual COnsumption by Purpose). The dataset also includes detailed information on income from employment,
beneﬁts and assets in the most recent 12 months, as well as on a range of socio-demographic characteristics.
Geographic identiﬁers at the postcode unit level (e.g. LS2 9JT) are provided in the ‘Secure Access’ version of LCFS (ONS and
DEFRA, 2016). We use these to match household records to Experian Catalist Historic Fuel Price Data, including weekly average
unleaded petrol and diesel prices at the postcode district level (e.g. LS2) for the period 2006–2012. LCFS and fuel price data are
matched based on year, month and postcode district.1
The elasticity estimation part of our analysis is based on the pooled 2006–2012 LCFS dataset (N= 41,007), as this provides us
with both spatial and temporal variation in fuel price data, as well as an ample sample size for robust dissagregated analysis.2 In the
remainder of the analysis, we use data for 2012 (N=5,596), i.e. the most recent year for which both LCFS and fuel price data are
available, as we aim to provide the most up-to-date estimates of the problem.
3.3. A ‘Low Income High Costs’ metric of car-related economic stress
In order to identify households in CRES, we adapt a methodology developed in the UK for the measurement of ‘fuel poverty’. The
notion of fuel poverty refers to the aﬀordability of domestic energy (most notably heating), and underpins well-established research
and policy agenda (Boardman, 1991, 2010; Hills, 2012). The oﬃcial deﬁnition of fuel poverty in England is currently based on the
‘Low Income High Costs’ (LIHC) indicator (Hills, 2012), henceforth referred to as the ‘Hills’ indicator’. This metric deﬁnes ‘fuel poor’
households as those who (a) have “required fuel costs that are above the median level” and (b) “were they to spend that amount they
would be left with a residual income below the oﬃcial poverty line” (i.e. 60% of the median) (Hills, 2012, p. 9). The depth of the
problem is measured by the ‘fuel poverty gap’, deﬁned as “the amounts by which the assessed energy needs of fuel poor households
exceed the threshold for reasonable cost” (Hills, 2012, p.9). A number of studies have adapted fuel poverty indicators for transport
aﬀordability analysis (e.g. Berry et al., 2016; Lovelace and Philips, 2014; Mayer et al., 2014; Sustrans, 2012). This paper proposes one
of such indicators, and applies it to the LCFS dataset. A detailed discussion of the rationale for choices in the construction of the
indicator (including e.g. income and expenditure thresholds) is provided in Mattioli et al. (2017a).
In keeping with the logic of the Hills indicator of domestic fuel poverty, in our study we deﬁne LIHC households as those falling
below an income threshold and above a cost threshold. We considered costs for ‘running motor vehicles’, as reported in the LCFS
dataset, which includes motor fuels as well as other variable costs of motoring such as vehicle road tax, insurance, repairs, parking
fees, etc.3 The cost threshold is deﬁned as twice the median of the cost share of ‘running motor vehicles’ (i.e. the percentage of income
spent on it) in the ﬁrst year of the dataset (2006), which gives a threshold of 9.5%. We suggest that households with a cost burden
higher than this should be considered as incurring disproportionately high expenditures for motoring. Twice-median thresholds like the
1 There are 3,107 postcode districts in the UK, with an average of approximately 9,000 households per district. In cases where information on prices at the postcode
district level was missing, the average value of prices for that month at the postcode area level was assigned (e.g. LS). As the LCFS dataset does not provide postcodes
for households in Northern Ireland, all Northern Irish households were assigned average fuel price values for Northern Ireland as a whole.
2 The dataset includes suﬃcient variation in the real per liter price of petrol (min: 0.77£; max: 1.19£; mean: 0.99£; std. dev.: 0.10£) and diesel (min: 0.86£; max:
1.27£; mean: 1.03£; std. dev.: 0.10£), which allows us to model the disaggregated price elasticities of fuel demand.
3 Fixed costs (e.g. vehicle purchase) are excluded from the analysis for two reasons. First, most sampled households do not report any expenditure for car purchase in
the 12 months before the interview, while a minority reports very high values, and this might skew the analysis. Second, previous studies have shown that the purchase
of a car is a luxury good, with wealthier households spending a higher share of their income on more expensive cars, which are also substituted more frequently
(Demoli, 2015; Kauppila, 2011).
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one adopted here are frequently used in fuel poverty research and in other areas to identify critically high values4 (Heindl and
Schuessler, 2015; Liddell et al., 2012).
With regard to income, we consider weekly-equivalent household income (including allowances), net of expenditure on housing
and ‘running motor vehicles’. The reason for deducting housing costs is that they represent necessary expenditures, i.e. those which
cannot be avoided, and which are highly variable across regions of the UK (Clarke et al., 2016). Income after housing costs is thus
often considered as a preferable measure of disposable income, and as such it is used in Hills’ fuel poverty indicator. Following Hills
(2012), we deduct ‘running motor vehicles’ costs (in addition to housing costs) from the household incomes. This is to take into
account the additional households that are pushed over the poverty line by high motoring costs. To adjust for diﬀerences in
household size and composition, we divide the remaining income by the modiﬁed OECD ‘after housing costs’ equivalence scale
factors. Following common practice in the UK and the EU (see e.g. Eurostat, 2017; McGuinness, 2016) we set a poverty line at 60% of
the median of the resulting income distribution, and adopt this as the income threshold.
Based on the combined cost and income thresholds we identify four groups (as illustrated graphically in Fig. 1): ‘Low Income High
Costs’ (LIHC), ‘Low Income Low Costs’ (LILC), ‘Higher Income High Costs’ (HIHC) and ‘Higher Income Low Costs’ (HILC).5 LIHC
households (in the upper left quadrant in Fig. 1) have disproportionately high expenditure on motoring (relative to income), and are
left with disposable income below the poverty line after the costs of running motor vehicles are deducted. We adopt the headline
count of LIHC households as a measure of the extent of car related economic stress. In Section 4.1, we use descriptive statistics and
logistic regression models to identify the socio-demographic and geographic factors associated with membership of the LIHC group.
Drawing again on Hills (2012), we complement the indicator of extent with an indicator of the depth of the economic stress, i.e.
how much more LIHC households spend as compared to the cost threshold. This measures the average severity of aﬀordability
problems among LIHC households, regardless of how many people fall into this group. The CRES gap is computed as follows:
=
∑ − −=GAP
CBR
N
[( 9.5)/(100 9.5)]i
N
i1
(1)
where CBRi is the cost burden ratio – i.e. the share of income spent on running motor vehicles – for LIHC household i, and N is the
number of LIHC households. The metric can be interpreted as the mean diﬀerence (in percentage points) between the cost burden ratio of
Fig. 1. Diagrammatical representation of the LIHC headcount indicator, based on data for 2012 (N=5,596). Notes: extreme values (more than 40%
income spent or £1000 weekly-equivalent income) are omitted from the graph for conﬁdentiality reasons.
4 Unlike the original LIHC metric, our indicator considers actual, rather than required, expenditure. This is because determining normative standards of required
travel is a formidable challenge (Berry et al., 2016; Jouﬀe and Massot, 2013; Mattioli et al., 2017a; Mayer et al., 2014; ONPE, 2014; Stokes and Lucas, 2011; Titheridge
et al., 2014), which is beyond the scope of this study.
5 It is important to stress that households in the ‘higher income’ groups do not necessarily have high income – residual income is just higher than in the ‘low income
groups’, i.e. above the poverty line.
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LIHC households and the cost threshold (normalised in the range 0–16). This corresponds to the average distance between the dots in the
upper-left quadrant of Fig. 1 and the horizontal line representing the 9.5% cost threshold.
3.4. Elasticity estimation
There are two approaches to modelling heterogenous responses to price or income changes for diﬀerent socio-economic groups. In
the 'representative agent' approach, average consumption of diﬀerent groups is observed over a long time period along with the
changes in the average characteristics of the groups and other market variables (price and income) (e.g. Wadud et al., 2009). Studies
that focus on the eﬀect of socio-demographic characteristics on petrol demand generally tend to follow another approach, which
involves using household level data on consumption and socio-economic characteristics. Household data is also useful if the results
are later used for distributional analysis, as is the case here.
Several authors (e.g. Wadud et al., 2010a, 2010b; Romero-Jordan et al., 2014; Gillingham, 2014) have recently used the
household level micro-dataset to understand motor fuel demand, an approach ﬁrst proposed by Archibald and Gillingham (1980)
using the household production theory. In this approach, a household's motor fuel demand is speciﬁed as a function of fuel price,
household income, vehicle and household characteristics and other transport characteristics. This approach assumes a homogenous
response, i.e. the elasticity of fuel demand with respect to fuel price (or income, or other variables) is the same across all households.
In order to accommodate the hypothesis that elasticities could vary among diﬀerent household types this paper uses the approach
adopted by Wadud et al. (2010a), interacting the socio-economic characteristics with fuel price (or income) in order to get an
estimate of how they aﬀect the relative elasticities. The speciﬁc characteristic still has a homogenous eﬀect across all households of
similar type (say, urban location), however, since those similar households will diﬀer in another socio-economic characteristic (say,
income), each household can have a unique elasticity in this speciﬁcation. Whether the eﬀects of the interacted socio-economic
characteristics are signiﬁcant or not can be determined using statistical tests. In order to accommodate the potentially diﬀerent
household types, in this study the general speciﬁcation of fuel demand from personal vehicles has the form:
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑= + + + + + + + + +
= = = =
lnF α β lnY β lnY β lnPlnY β lnP μ D γ D lnY δ D lnP φ LlnP θ Z( )Y Y PY P
k
k k
k
k k
k
k k L
m
n
m m
2
1
3
1
3
1
3
1 (2)
where, F, P, and Y refer to fuel consumption of the household, retail price of fuel and income of the household respectively. The
variables Zm stands for socio-economic characteristics. The Greek characters refer to the parameters that need to be estimated from
the data. We add squared of income (Y) to accommodate the possibility that income elasticity itself could change with higher income.
We have also interacted income with fuel price (P) to understand the eﬀect of income on price elasticities. A priori, it is expected that
price elasticities would fall as income increases, as suggested by previous research (Wadud et al., 2010a).
The prime interest in this study is the response of the four diﬀerent groups (LIHC, LILC, HIHC, HILC) to fuel price changes. In the
model, three indicator variables (Dk), representing these groups, are included on their own as well as interacted separately with
income and price (the fourth group remains the reference group7). Following earlier ﬁndings that households in urban areas are more
price responsive, price is also interacted with an indicator variable for Central London (L), where public transport has higher pa-
tronage (DfT, 2015). We include a number of socioeconomic characteristics in the model, which have been associated with fuel
demand in previous research (reviewed in Section 2.3). These include family size, presence of children or adults older than 64 years
of age, location, gender of household reference person, number of vehicles in the household and whether any of the vehicles run on
diesel. While education is generally a useful determinant, the LCFS dataset does not contain this variable for 2006.
In the UK in 2015, more than half of new personal vehicle ﬂeet ran on diesel, although the share is smaller in the total vehicle
stock. Diesel also has a larger energy content compared to petrol, which allows it to travel further per unit of volume of the fuel.
Therefore, the diesel consumptions in the households are multiplied by 1.10, and energy (E) is used as the dependent model in the
primary model (Model 3 in Table 3 below), where E=Petrol+ 1.1 Diesel.8 For the model where Fuel (F) is the dependent variable
(Model 4 in Table 3 below), diesel and petrol fuel consumptions are simply added (F=Petrol+Diesel).
Note that in a traditional log-linear demand model the parameter estimates for lnY and lnP will directly represent the income and
price elasticities. However, as we have interacted income and fuel price with other variables, the parameter estimates for income (βY)
or fuel price (βP) do not represent income or price elasticity directly here. Instead the income and price elasticities –which would be
unique for every household because of their diﬀerences in income and socio-economic groups – are to be calculated as derivatives of
Eq. (2) with respect to income and price as follows (Eqs. (3) and (4)):
6 In order to avoid that the measure is skewed by extreme values, all values of CBR higher than 100 (i.e. spending more than 100% of their weekly equivalent
income on running motor vehicles) are substituted with 100 in the calculation.
7 We acknowledge that the inclusion of these indicator variables in the model raises a potential issue of simultaneity. However we believe that this is not strong, as
fuel consumption is only one among several factors that contribute to the deﬁnition of the four groups, and only in a rather indirect way. In detail: i) fuel costs are only
a subset of the motoring costs considered in the 'cost burden' element of the classiﬁcation – a whole range of other expenditure items are taken into account (e.g.
vehicle road tax; vehicle insurance; car servicing; repairs; other motor oils; breakdown services; parking fees, tolls and permits; garage rent; costs for the annual vehicle
roadworthiness test); ii) the 'cost burden' element of the classiﬁcation is a ratio between total expenditure for running motor vehicles and income, further diluting the
relationship between fuel consumption and group membership; iii) 'cost burden' is only one of the two elements that deﬁned the classiﬁcation, the other being
equivalised residual income (i.e. after deducting housing and 'running motor vehicles' costs).
8 The conversion factor of 1.10 corresponds to the approximate ratio between the energy intensity of diesel (35.86 MJ/L) and petrol (32.18 MJ/L).
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The interest in this study is not to generate an aggregate national level elasticity, but rather to generate estimates for households
that already consume petrol or diesel for their transport needs. Therefore OLS can be used to estimate the model, even though
households that do not consume fuel and thus do not own a vehicle are not included in the analysis sample.9 However, the errors are
likely to be non-normal (and sometimes heteroskedastic), therefore the standard errors are modiﬁed using White's robust variance
matrix.
4. Results
4.1. LIHC indicator
In 2012, 9.4% of UK households were classiﬁed as ‘Low Income, High Costs’ (LIHC). The rest of the population was distributed
among ‘Low Income, Low Costs’ (10.1%), ‘Higher Income, Low Costs’ (62.0%) and ‘Higher Income, High Costs’ (18.5%). The ‘gap’
metric value for LIHC households was 0.161 (on a scale from 0 to 1). This means that LIHC households spend on average ap-
proximately 24% of their income on running motor vehicles, i.e. more than twice the ‘high cost’ threshold.
Table 1 shows the incidence of the four groups for diﬀerent sectors of the population (with the variables corresponding to the
predictors in the regression models of Table 2 below, plus car ownership). It shows that the incidence of LIHC is rather similar across
population socio-economic sectors, exceeding 15% only among households with unemployed members and those with a non-white
reference person. Further analysis (not reported here for the sake of brevity) shows that 67% of households who are in poverty (after
housing costs) and own cars belong to the LIHC group. Conversely, 67% of LILC households do not own cars.
Table 2 presents the results of two logistic regression models, both including the same predictors. The models aim to (i) identify
the characteristics that distinguish LIHC households from the average of the population, as well as (ii) the drivers of ‘high costs’
among the low-income population. To this end, Model 1 uses the full 2012 sample, and models the probability of belonging to the
LIHC group, as opposed to any other group in our classiﬁcation. Model 2 models the probability of belonging to the LIHC group,
rather than LILC. The independent variables cover socio-demographics (household composition, age, employment, gender, and ethnic
origin) as well as degree of urbanisation of the residential area.10 Previous research has found these factors to be associated with low
income, car ownership and use (e.g. Lucas et al., 2016a; Mattioli, 2014, 2017; Stokes and Lucas, 2011). In addition, we include two
housing-related variables: the category of dwelling (as a proxy for the density of the built environment in the neighbourhood), and
tenure (in order to investigate the relationships with home ownership and housing expenditure). Note that we are unable to include a
number of variables in the model (e.g. income, housing costs, car ownership), as these were used to deﬁne the outcome variable (or
are strongly related to it), and so including them would raise endogeneity issues.
The low goodness of ﬁt of Model 1 suggests that overall the predictors do not discriminate well between LIHC and the rest of the
sample. This is consistent with the fairly even incidence of LIHC across population socio-economic sectors shown by descriptive
statistics (Table 1). Despite the poor ﬁt, Model 1 shows that households with children, with unemployed members, and those living in
rural areas or Northern Ireland are signiﬁcantly more likely to belong to the LIHC group. So do households with a reference person
who is between 30 and 49 years old, male or non-white. Households living in a ﬂat or with mortgages are signiﬁcantly less likely to
have low income and high costs.
Model 2 compares ‘Low Income High Costs’ households to ‘Low Income Low Costs’ households. This highlights factors associated
with car-related economic stress among the low-income population. The model has better goodness-of-ﬁt, suggesting that LIHC
households diﬀer more from other low-income households than from the average British household. A comparison of Model 1 and 2
shows that, while some variables have similar eﬀects in both models (presence of children, age, gender, rurality) other coeﬃcients
change sign or signiﬁcance. The presence of employed members has a negative eﬀect in Model 1, but a positive eﬀect in Model 2,
while the opposite change is observed for the ‘unemployed members’ dummy. This can be interpreted as follows: LIHC households,
like other low-income households, are overrepresented among those with unemployed and non-employed members. However, the
‘working poor’ are more likely than other low-income households to face high motoring costs. Incidentally, this suggests that for some
households, employment-based income is not enough to get them out of poverty, after the cost burden of running motor vehicles is
accounted for.
A similar pattern is observed for ethnicity: non-white households are overrepresented among low-income groups, but a non-white
background does not signiﬁcantly increase the likelihood of high motoring costs among the poor. Conversely, the presence of
9 It must be noted that, while the exclusion of carless households from the analysis raises potential sample selectivity problems (see e.g. Kayser, 2000), the interest
here is on the 'actual eﬀects' of fuel price, i.e. the eﬀects on actual fuel consumption among those who own and use cars (see Frondel and Vance, 2009).
10 The variable we use is based on the ONS 2011 Rural-Urban classiﬁcation for England and Wales (ONS, 2013) and the Scottish Government Urban Rural
Classiﬁcation (Granville et al., 2009). As no urban–rural variable is available for households in Northern Ireland, we group them in a separate category. Within Great
Britain, we distinguish between the London Metropolitan area, ‘other metropolitan areas’ (in the North East, North West, Yorkshire and the Humber, West Midlands
and Glasgow), ‘other urban areas’ (other areas classiﬁed as urban but outside of metropolitan areas), and ‘rural areas’.
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members with mobility diﬃculties is not signiﬁcantly associated with LIHC in Model 1, but increases the probability of a low-income
household facing high costs in Model 2, possibly by increasing reliance on cars.
With regard to housing, Model 2 shows that living in terraced housing or ﬂats signiﬁcantly reduces the probability of LIHC (as
compared to LILC). Also, living in a (public or private) rented accommodation is associated with a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect in Model
2, but not in Model 1. This suggests that LIHC households, like other low-income households, are overrepresented among renters, but
home ownership is associated with high motoring costs among poor households.
The relationship between LIHC and type of area deserves further comment. Outside of Northern Ireland, the incidence of LIHC is
relatively homogenous across the urban rural-spectrum (Table 1). This partly reﬂects higher poverty rates in metropolitan and urban
areas. Among low-income households, the incidence of LIHC is indeed signiﬁcantly higher in rural areas (49%) than in London
(32%), other metropolitan (30%) and urban areas (32% - detailed ﬁgures not reported for the sake of brevity). The net association
between rurality and LIHC is conﬁrmed by the coeﬃcients in Model 2, which also show no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between London,
metropolitan and other urban areas. There are two possible explanations for this. The ﬁrst is that part of the built environment eﬀect
is picked up by the category of dwelling variable (as the share of ﬂats and terraced houses is higher in metropolitan areas and
particularly in London). The second is that the urban-rural variable used here is a rather broad-brush categorisation (Pateman, 2011),
which may mask considerable variation within each area. However, we are unable to include more detailed variables (such as public
transport accessibility or job density) due to the data limitations of the LCFS.
Having described the incidence patterns of CRES in the UK, in the next section we present the results of the estimation of the
elasticity of fuel demand.
Table 1
Distribution of the ‘income/motoring costs’ indicator among diﬀerent sectors of the population in 2012 (percentage values) (N= 5,596).
LIHC LILC HILC HIHC Total
Total 9 10 62 19 100
Variable Level
Household size 1 8 14 65 13 100
2 9 7 63 21 100
3 9 9 60 22 100
4 or more 12 12 57 20 100
Children None 8 10 63 18 100
1 or more 12 10 60 18 100
Full-time or self-employed members None 13 18 57 13 100
1 or more 7 4 66 23 100
Part-time employed members None 9 11 63 17 100
1 or more 11 9 58 23 100
Unemployed members None 9 8 64 19 100
1 or more 17 29 42 12 100
Age of household reference person (HRP)a 15–29 9 20 53 17 100
30–49 10 8 63 18 100
50–65 10 8 60 22 100
65+ 8 10 66 16 100
Recipients of DLA (mobility)b None 9 10 61 19 100
1 or more 9 6 70 15 100
Ethnic origin of HRP White 9 9 63 19 100
Non white 16 19 50 15 100
Sex of HRP Male 10 9 61 21 100
Female 9 12 64 15 100
Category of dwelling Detached 10 4 62 24 100
Semi-detached 10 7 61 21 100
Terraced 10 15 59 16 100
Flat/other 7 15 66 12 100
Tenure type Owned outright/rent free 10 8 61 21 100
Owned with mortgage/rental purchase 7 3 66 23 100
Local Authority/Housing Association rented 10 17 62 10 100
Other rented 12 21 54 13 100
Type of area London 10 12 66 13 100
Other metropolitan areas 10 12 62 16 100
Other urban 8 10 64 18 100
Rural 12 7 56 26 100
Northern Ireland 15 8 51 26 100
Cars and vans in household None 1 27 71 1 100
1 14 7 61 18 100
2 or more 9 1 56 33 100
Notes:
a The household reference person (HRP) is the householder who is legally responsible for the accommodation or has the higher income (ONS,
2013b).
b In the UK individuals are eligible for the mobility component of the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) if they have walking diﬃculties.
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4.2. Elasticity estimation results
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for our econometric model of fuel demand. Model 3 and 4 both have an R2 in excess of
0.42, indicating a good ﬁt. Other potential explanatory factors (annual trend, monthly dummies, age of household reference person)
did not improve the ﬁt via Adjusted R2, AIC or BIC, therefore we excluded them from the ﬁnal model.
Results show that demand for transport energy increases with the number of members and number of vehicles in the household.
Presence of children or elderly people in the household reduces the energy consumption, possibly because their travel demand is not
as high as for active adults. Households in metropolitan areas have a lower energy consumption compared to those in other, smaller
urban areas. Demand for fuel for car users in Greater London is not statistically diﬀerent from those in other urban areas. As expected
rural households use more fuel for their travel, as do those located in Northern Ireland.
Households that own at least one diesel vehicle consume more energy compared to those with petrol vehicles only. Generally
diesel owners are a self-selected group: those who expect to travel more tend to purchase diesel vehicles because of their better fuel
economy and corresponding lower running costs. Households with female household reference person (HRP – see note a, Table 1)
consume less energy.
Table 4 presents the price and income elasticities of an average household in each of the four groups identiﬁed in the previous
section, evaluated at median income of that speciﬁc group and median fuel price over the whole sample. It shows that households in
the LIHC group have the lowest price response. This suggests that households in car-related economic stress, who already spend a
disproportionate share of income on motoring, will increase expenditure even more if faced with a fuel price spike, further eroding
disposable income. LIHC households also have the lowest income elasticity, indicating they spend a larger share of any additional
income on other consumption (or saving) compared to other households, while LILC and HIHC have the highest income elasticity.
Table 2
Parameter estimates for the logistic regression for the probability of belonging to the LIHC group in 2012.
Model Model 1 Model 2
Outcome LIHC LIHC
Base outcome Rest of the sample LILC
Variable Level Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error
Household size
(reference category: 1)
2 0.178 0.138 0.577*** 0.182
3 0.028 0.206 −0.131 0.285
4 or more 0.237 0.226 −0.567* 0.337
Children
(reference category: None)
1 or more 0.294* 0.176 0.738*** 0.28
Full-time or self-employed members
(reference category: None)
1 or more −1.106*** 0.154 0.891*** 0.197
Part-time employed members
(reference category: None)
1 or more −0.012 0.121 0.347* 0.189
Unemployed members
(reference category: None)
1 or more 0.476*** 0.17 −0.309 0.201
Age of HRP
(reference category: 15–29)
30–49 0.320* 0.193 0.482* 0.248
50–65 0.205 0.211 0.453* 0.268
65 or older −0.468** 0.237 0.017 0.313
Recipients of DLA (mobility)
(reference category: None)
1 or more −0.208 0.195 0.786** 0.311
Ethnic origin of HRP
(reference category: White)
Non-white 0.642*** 0.165 0.189 0.242
Sex of HRP
(reference category: Male)
Female −0.263** 0.113 −0.307** 0.149
Category of dwelling
(reference category: Detached)
Semi-detached 0.056 0.135 −0.346 0.232
Terraced −0.015 0.148 −0.996*** 0.237
Flat/other −0.472** 0.195 −1.067*** 0.285
Tenure type
(reference category: Owned outright/rent free)
Owned with mortgage/rental purchase −0.377** 0.156 0.001 0.247
Local Authority/Housing Association rented −0.182 0.169 −0.522** 0.23
Other rented 0.09 0.177 −0.813*** 0.235
Type of area
(reference category: London)
Other metropolitan areas 0.057 0.172 −0.123 0.24
Other urban areas −0.089 0.151 −0.284 0.208
Rural 0.461*** 0.161 0.477* 0.25
Northern Ireland 0.678*** 0.258 0.422 0.422
Diagnostics
N 5,596 1,081
McFadden's Pseudo R2 0.062 0.15
Notes: upon request of the data provider, the constant terms are omitted to prevent disclosure risks for models with all explanatory categorical
variables.
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
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Table 3
Regression results for household fuel demand (based on pooled 2006–2012 sample).
Model Model 3 Model 4
Equation Energy equation Fuel equation
Variable Level Coef. Std. error Coef. Std. error
Income −1.008*** 0.322 −1.042*** 0.323
Income (squared) 0.047*** 0.008 0.047*** 0.008
Fuel price −2.481*** 0.424 −2.526*** 0.425
Fuel price * Income
(interaction term)
0.267*** 0.069 0.273*** 0.069
Household size 0.112*** 0.012 0.113*** 0.012
Children
(reference category: None)
1 or more −0.042*** 0.011 −0.043*** 0.011
No. of members 65 years old or older
(reference category: None)
1 or more −0.098*** 0.009 −0.099*** 0.009
No. of cars and vans in household 0.151*** 0.011 0.157*** 0.011
Sex of HRP
(reference category: Male)
Female −0.014* 0.008 −0.013* 0.008
Type of area
(reference category: Other urban areas)
London 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.014
Other metropolitan areas −0.048*** 0.011 −0.048*** 0.011
Rural 0.070*** 0.009 0.071*** 0.009
Northern Ireland 0.087*** 0.014 0.086*** 0.014
LIHC groups
(reference category: LILC)
LIHC −0.113 0.901 −0.161 0.903
HILC 1.134 0.841 1.133 0.843
HIHC −0.231 0.853 −0.275 0.855
Interaction terms between LIHC groups and Income
(reference category: LILC)
LIHC * Income −0.372*** 0.049 −0.369*** 0.049
HILC * Income −0.296*** 0.044 −0.295*** 0.045
HIHC * Income −0.135*** 0.045 −0.131*** 0.045
Interaction terms between LIHC groups and Fuel price
(reference category: LILC)
LIHC * Fuel price 0.675*** 0.185 0.681*** 0.185
HILC * Fuel price 0.157 0.173 0.156 0.173
HIHC * Fuel price 0.382** 0.174 0.387** 0.175
Interaction term between Type of area and Fuel price
(reference category: Other urban)
London * Fuel price −0.028*** 0.004 −0.028*** 0.004
No. of diesel vehicles in household
(reference category: None)
1 or more 0.216*** 0.008 0.138*** 0.008
Constant 10.875*** 1.952 11.106*** 1.956
Diagnostics
N 25,913 25,913
R2 0.44 0.43
AIC 42799.09 42948.20
BIC 43003.1 43152.26
Notes: All continuous variables are transformed into natural logs.
Income and fuel prices are expressed in real prices (year 2005).
* p < 0.10.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
Table 4
Groupwise price and income elasticities and standard errors (all elasticities measured at respective group median income).
Energy model Fuel model
Price elasticity Income elasticity Price elasticity Income elasticity
1. LILC −0.967 (0.158)2,3,4 0.747 (0.042)2,3 −0.980 (0.158)2,3,4 0.746 (0.043)2,3
2. LIHC −0.334 (0.097)1,3 0.360 (0.025)1,3,4 −0.341 (0.097)1,3 0.362 (0.025)1,3,4
3. HILC −0.560 (0.045)1,2 0.539 (0.012)1,2,4 −0.568 (0.046)1,2,4 0.539 (0.012)1,2,4
4. HIHC −0.411 (0.063)1 0.700 (0.017)2,3 −0.415 (0.064)1,3 0.703 (0.017)2,3
Notes:
- All values are statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
- Items in superscript indicate which values are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from each other (Wald test at the 0.05 level).
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This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Wadud et al. (2010a, 2010b), who have found low income elasticity for low income groups in
the US.
Unlike LIHC, ‘Low Income Low Costs’ households have the highest price response, i.e. the greatest adaptive capacity. This may be
due to low levels of commuting for these households and low levels of car dependence in the residential area: LILC households are
overrepresented among households with non-employed members and among those living in higher-density urban areas, which are
better served by public transit options (Table 1).
4.3. Price increase simulations
The third step of the analysis is to simulate how the CRES indicators would be aﬀected by large changes in fuel prices. Table 5
compares the extent (percentage of LIHC households) and depth (CRES gap value, last row in Table 5) of car-related economic stress
in 2012 with two hypothetical scenarios.
In Scenario 1 ('no price response'), fuel prices increase by 20%, and this results in an increase of 20% in expenditure on fuel for
every household. This is a deliberately constructed unrealistic scenario, where household fuel demand is totally inelastic, i.e. any
increase in price is matched by an equivalent increase in expenditure, and elasticities are equal for all households. In Scenario 2
('individual price response'), the elasticity estimation results presented in the previous section are used to estimate unique price
elasticity values for each household. These values are then used to estimate how much household fuel consumption and expenditure
would change as a result of a 20% increase in fuel prices. This is a more realistic scenario, as it takes into account that most
households will reduce their demand in response to a price increase, as well as diﬀerences in elasticity between households. This
approach is better suited to assess the welfare and distributional impacts of fuel price increases, as it takes into account behavioural
responses11 (Santos and Catchesides, 2005; West and Williams, 2004).
Table 5 shows that the headline count of LIHC households would increase from 9.4% to 10.2% in a scenario where fuel prices and
expenditure both increase by 20%. However, there is barely any increase at all in Scenario 2 (9.6%), in which the elasticity of fuel
price demand is taken into account. It must be noted, however, that the share of ‘Higher Income, High Cost’ households increases in
both scenarios, although more markedly in Scenario 1. Finally, the depth of economic stress for LIHC households would increase by
virtually the same amount in both in Scenario 1 and 2.
This suggests that even large increases in fuel prices would not be reﬂected in a substantial increase in the headline count of LIHC
households. Due to the relative inelasticity of their fuel demand, however, any increase in fuel prices would result in a deepening of
the car-related economic stress that they experience – i.e. households who are already in a critical situation would spend even more
on fuel. The implication is that they would have to ﬁnd these additional funds either by reducing their expenditures in other areas of
the household budget, or that they would need to borrow the money from somewhere and tip over into (at least short term) debt.
The impact of a 20% fuel price increase is illustrated graphically in Fig. 2, which replicates Fig. 1 while showing, for each
household, an arrow connecting their actual motoring expenditure in 2012 with their estimated expenditure in Scenario 2.12 It shows
that very few households tip over into the LIHC group, as most LILC households barely move across the plot area (due to high price
response), while the expenditure increases among HIHC households are generally not large enough to bring them below the poverty
line. On the other hand, LIHC households show a rather large movement toward the upper left corner of the graph, indicating a
further deterioration of their aﬀordability situation. Also, quite a few HILC households who are near the cost threshold in 2012 tip
over into the HIHC group, possibly due to relatively low price elasticity for this group. This suggests that, if the income threshold was
set higher (i.e. further to the right in Fig. 2), the LIHC headcount indicator would be more sensitive to changes in fuel prices.
5. Discussion
Our analysis has provided three indicators for the assessment of vulnerability to motor fuel price increases, namely i) the extent of
Table 5
Values of CRES indicators in 2012 and in two price increase scenarios (N=5,596).
CRES indicators 2012 Scenario 1 (no price response) Scenario 2 (individual price response)
Extent: headline count (%)
Low Income, Low Costs (LILC) 10.1% 9.6% 10.1%
Low Income, High Costs (LIHC) 9.4% 10.2% 9.6%
Higher Income, Low Costs (HILC) 62.0% 58.2% 60.6%
Higher Income, High Costs (HIHC) 18.5% 22.0% 19.8%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Depth
CRES gap (for LIHC group) 0.161 0.176 0.174
11 In both scenarios, The LIHC headline count and gap metrics are recalculated based on increased expenditure, although the cost burden threshold remains ﬁxed at
9.5%. This is necessary to ensure that the metrics satisfy the dynamic properties of aﬀordability measures (Heindl & Schüssler, 2015).
12 Note that by construction the dots in Fig. 2 can only 'move' upwards and leftwards within the scatterplot. This is because, by deﬁnition, a fuel price increase
cannot result in either an increase in income or a reduction in motoring expenditure.
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CRES (percentage of households in LIHC group), ii) the depth of CRES (gap between average expenditure on motoring of LIHC
households and high-cost threshold), and iii) the price elasticity of motor fuel demand for LIHC households. These indicators are
related to the three dimensions of the vulnerability framework. The main ﬁnding of our analysis is to show the presence of a distinct
population sector characterised by low income, high motoring costs, and low response to fuel price changes – i.e. with high exposure,
high sensitivity and low adaptive capacity to fuel price increases. These households, which are consequently considered to be in car-
related economic stress, accounted for 9.4% of UK households in 2012, corresponding to roughly 2.5 million households. Most low-
income households who own cars are included in this group, which suggests that for poor UK households car ownership tends to
result in economic stress.
The broad ﬁnding that part of the low-income population is reliant on cars, spends disproportionate amounts on motoring, and
would be badly aﬀected by fuel price increases is consistent with previous research from the UK (Chatterton et al., 2018; Froud et al.,
2002; Lucas, 2011; Santos and Catchesides, 2005) and elsewhere (Berry et al., 2016; Demoli, 2015; Kayser, 2000). Our analysis goes
beyond previous research in demonstrating a structured and comprehensive approach to investigating car-related economic stress
and vulnerability to fuel price increases, based on quantitative data at the household level. This allows us to quantify the incidence
and depth of the problem, to describe the aﬀected population, and to model the impacts of fuel price changes within an integrated
assessment framework.
Our ﬁndings suggest that households in CRES share some characteristics with other low-income households (e.g. lower em-
ployment rates, overrepresentation of ethnic minorities), while at the same time diﬀering from them in a number of respects. Notably,
some of the factors associated with high costs among low-income households (e.g. presence of employed household members, middle
adulthood, and home ownership) tend to make them more similar to the average of the UK population, putting them on the ‘edge of
social inclusion’. Overall, we ﬁnd remarkably little variation in the incidence of CRES across socio-demographic groups, which can be
explained by the counteracting eﬀects discussed above.
We also ﬁnd few diﬀerences in the incidence of CRES across types of area and, while as expected there is an association between
CRES, low-density building types and rurality, this is not particularly strong. Perhaps this is because in the UK deprivation tends to be
concentrated in urban areas and near city centres, where car dependence is lower (Bailey and Minton, 2018; Eurostat, 2015; Hunter,
2016; Pateman, 2011; Rae, 2012; Stokes, 2015), and this confounds the observed relationship between CRES and urbanity. This
would demonstrate the key role played by urban socio-spatial conﬁgurations in determining spatial patterns of CRES and fuel price
vulnerability, as discussed in Section 2.2. A complementary explanation is that, unlike most previous research on oil vulnerability,
our analysis considers the entirety of household expenditure on running motor vehicles, including e.g. parking costs. Nicolas and Pelé
(2017) have shown that high parking costs in urban cores can partially oﬀset the spatial gradient of motoring costs, which otherwise
tend to be higher in periurban areas.
Taken together, the results of this study suggest that the aﬀordability of motoring costs is an issue that cuts across various social
groups and types of area, and should not be considered as an exclusively peri-urban or rural problem, particularly in the UK. In this
Fig. 2. Changes in motoring expenditure and residual income in Scenario 2 (N=5,596). Notes: extreme values (more than 40% income spent or
£1000 weekly-equivalent income in 2012 data) are omitted from the graph for conﬁdentiality reasons.
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regard, it supports recent research by Curl et al. (2018), which found high levels of ‘forced car ownership’ and related ﬁnancial
distress in disadvantaged urban communities in Glasgow. Also, our ﬁndings concerning the socio-demographic and spatial factors
associated with CRES are remarkably consistent with Mattioli’s study of ‘forced car owners’ (i.e. households who own cars despite
being in material deprivation), which has used living conditions data for the UK (Mattioli, 2017). This suggests that these broad
ﬁndings are robust to the use of diﬀerent sources of data and empirical deﬁnitions.
Our analysis of the heterogeneity of fuel demand elasticity allows us to provide further insights into CRES. The fact that
households with low income and high costs have low response to fuel price changes may be explained by an inability to switch to
more fuel-eﬃcient household vehicles, as most of them own a single car only. However, it may also suggest that they have already
reduced their car travel to the bare minimum, that what remains fulﬁls essential functions that cannot be cut, and that they are highly
car dependent for these trips, having no other viable transport option available to them in the areas where they live (Kayser, 2000;
Wadud et al., 2009).
While our data do not allow a direct investigation of travel behaviour, we can hypothesize that a large part of the fuel con-
sumption of LIHC households is for commuting, work-related or for livelihood. They are more likely to include employed members
than other low-income households, and previous research suggests that the price elasticity of commuting may be lower than that of
other trips (Dillon et al., 2015). Based on national travel survey data for Great Britain, Stokes and Lucas (2011) identify a group of
low-income, working households who travel to work predominantly by car but make very few non-work journeys, and suggest that
this may be due to aﬀordability reasons (Stokes, 2015). The overlap between in-work poverty and CRES is interesting in light of the
current UK’s Conservative Government’s welfare policy discourse, which sees 'Just About Managing' (JAMs) (Schmuecker, 2016) or
'Ordinary Working Families' (BBC, 2017) as most deserving of additional ﬁnancial support.
The ﬁndings also show that households in CRES have the lowest income elasticity of demand. This may suggest that high mo-
toring costs lead them to compromise on other important areas of their household expenditures, so that any income increase is used to
increase non-fuel consumption (Wadud et al., 2009). Previous research has shown that the 'motoring poor' are willing to make
important ﬁnancial sacriﬁces to maintain car ownership and use (Curl et al., 2018; Deutsch et al., 2015; Demoli, 2015; Froud et al.,
2002; Mattioli, 2017; Taylor et al., 2009), reducing expenditure on basic needs such as heating (Desjardins and Mettetal, 2012; Ortar,
2018) and food (Gicheva et al., 2007), and taking up debt (Walks, 2018).
The simulation results suggest that the number of households in CRES would remain substantially unchanged even in a scenario
where fuel prices increase by 20%. This is partly because most other households appear to have more latitude to reduce fuel demand
in response to price changes, which prevents them from tipping over the critical thresholds. However, the average depth of economic
stress for the aﬀected households would increase, reﬂecting the relative inelasticity of their response to price changes. This highlights
the importance of assessing both the incidence and the depth of this problem. On the other hand, our ﬁndings suggest that price
increases would result in a more substantial increase in the number of households facing high costs for motoring but who are not poor
(i.e. have residual income above the oﬃcial poverty line), and HIHC households are also characterised by relatively low response to
fuel price increases. Adopting a less stringent deﬁnition of low income would therefore likely highlight the vulnerability to fuel price
increases of households on medium to low incomes.
6. Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates a new empirical approach to the investigation of CRES and vulnerability to fuel price increases by
using disaggregated analysis at the household level and relating this to actual gasoline prices in their precise geographical locations.
It also brings together concepts and methods from diﬀerent, and hitherto fragmented, scientiﬁc disciplinary and policy arenas, such
as social deprivation, urban resilience, fuel poverty, and energy economics. By adopting this disaggregated (household-level) ap-
proach, we have been able to highlight that there is a socio-economic dimension to vulnerability to fuel price increases. While low-
density and rural areas tend to be more vulnerable, within each area certain types of households stand to lose the most from price
spikes. Even among the low-income group, some households are more likely to spend a disproportionate share of income on mo-
toring, and less likely to be able to reduce their car travel or fuel consumption.
This approach leads to diﬀerent policy recommendations. Previous research has highlighted the ‘oil vulnerability’ of low-income
settlements in car-dependent suburban and peri-urban areas, emphasising the need for compact city and transit oriented land use
development, as well as for improved public transport provision in the areas where these households are located. Our analysis has
highlighted the link between CRES and a number of socio-economic factors including e.g. in-work poverty, mobility diﬃculties and
access to home ownership among low-income households. This suggests diﬀerent entry points for local and national policy action
including housing and welfare policies (e.g. in-work and disability beneﬁts). The goal should be to ensure that the achievement of
social inclusion in key areas, such as employment and housing, does not come at the price of CRES and curtailed expenditure on other
household necessities.
More broadly, however, the issue of CRES raises a conundrum for social, environmental and resilience policy in the transport
sector. At ﬁrst sight, the ﬁndings of this study may seem to provide empirical backing for campaigns to reduce fuel taxes. Yet, on the
longer term, low levels of fuel taxation increase car dependence and vulnerability, e.g. by encouraging urban sprawl and discouraging
fuel-eﬃcient car choices, while also increasing the sensitivity of pump prices to ﬂuctuations in global oil markets. Also, a sustained
policy of fossil fuel tax reductions is hardly defensible in light of international climate agreements.
On the other hand, our ﬁndings suggest that environmental policies increasing motor fuel prices, while arguably beneﬁcial on the
longer term, are likely to cause considerable hardship among certain sectors of the population in the short term. This reduces the
public and political acceptability of such policy interventions. Ultimately, the only way out of the impasse is to ensure that
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households with limited ﬁnancial resources do not have to rely on private fossil fuel based vehicles for the satisfaction of basic needs
in everyday life. The analysis in this paper, along with previous research, suggests that this is not the case in the UK at present. It
could suggest that if such policies were to be enacted, the best welfare option move might be to subsidise the ownership of electric
vehicles for CRES households, thus reducing their fuel cost at the point of use.
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